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Does the Chinese banking system benefit  






We find empirical evidence that the Chinese banking system has benefited from the entry 
of foreign investors through higher profitability and increased efficiency of the banking 
system. Foreign participation, which consists of a minority stake in a Chinese bank (in con-
trast to the typical pattern in emerging countries), appears to be most effective when the 
foreign bank acts as a strategic investor. Purely financial investors contribute little, if any-
thing, to bank performance.  
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Löydämme todisteita siitä, että ulkomaalaisten sijoittajien läsnäolo Kiinan pankkimarkki-
noilla on johtanut pankkien kasvaneeseen kannattavuuteen ja suurempaan tehokkuuteen. 
Toisin kuin useimmissa muissa kehittyvissä talouksissa, Kiinassa ulkomaalaiset sijoittajat 
ovat ostaneet vähemmistöosuuksia pankeista. Ulkomaalaisten sijoittajien läsnäolo kiinalai-
sissa pankeissa näyttää vaikuttavan tehokkuuteen eniten, kun ulkomaalainen sijoittaja on 
pankissa strategisena sijoittajana. Pelkkä finanssisijoitus ei näytä vaikuttavan pankin te-
hokkuuteen. 
 
Asiasanat: Kiina, pankkijärjestelmä, ulkomaalaiset sijoittajat 
JEL: G21, G28 
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1  Introduction 
This paper aims at assessing how the Chinese banking system has benefited from non-
control foreign investment. Due to the different nature and degree of involvement of for-
eign investors, this work also examines the effect of different kinds of foreign investors on 
the performance of the domestic institutions. 
The opening-up of the banking sector to foreign participation was a key decision 
within a broader reform strategy. In fact, China’s banking sector and its financial system in 
general, remains the Achilles’ heel of an otherwise economic titan. While the banking sec-
tor is the most important component of the financial system (with 66% of total financial 
assets in 2006), it still remains relatively undercapitalized, unprofitable, and saddled with 
non-performing loans (NPLs) mainly as a result of the entrenched relations between state-
owned enterprises and banks while the country was moving from a planned to a market 
economy. 
After several unsuccessful attempts in the 1990s, the Chinese authorities’ approach 
to banking system reform changed in 2003. 
2  Their new strategy was built on three pillars. 
First, banks were recapitalized and NPLs taken off the balance sheets of troubled banks. 
Second, financial liberalization started through gradual deregulation of government driven 
allocation of credit and interest rates controls, opening-up to foreign competition and cau-
tious steps towards capital account liberalization. Third, financial regulation and supervi-
sion was strengthened, coupled with efforts to improve financial institutions corporate go-
vernance and transparency. While the reform process has improved Chinese banks’ per-
formance in recent years, government intervention remains pervasive. 
Encompassed in this reform, Chinese authorities have opened up their banking sys-
tem to foreign competition while tightly regulating it (see Appendix A). In their mind, al-
lowing foreign acquisitions of Chinese banks should enhance local banks performance, 
particularly through better management, risk assessment and corporate governance. At the 
same, however, to avoid losing public control over local institutions, foreign investors have 
so far been limited to acquiring only non-control stakes. The limits per bank are currently 
20% for a single foreign investor stake and 25% for a collective one. Greenfield invest-
ment in branches and subsidiaries is also allowed, although very tight regulation has made 
 




                                                
organic growth difficult and slow. In this environment, foreign banks’ options are either to 
accept a minority stake or slowly set up their own branches and subsidiaries. 
Notwithstanding the restrictions on control, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
into the Chinese financial sector have been substantial: more than USD 25 billion during 
2003–2007 (Figure 1). As of July 2007, 28 Chinese banks had received foreign investment. 
Table 1 shows the published agreements between foreign investors and Chinese banks.
 3   
 





2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
FDI INFLOW IN THE FINANCIAL SECTOR INCREASE IN BRANCH CAPITAL








2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007






Sources: People’s Bank of China and China Banking Regulatory Commission 
 
Obviously, China employs a distinctly different model of foreign bank entry from most 
emerging economies. Countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as many Latin 
American ones, simply opened their banking systems by allowing full foreign control of 
local banks. The Chinese minority stake approach, in contrast, can be taken as either a si-
lent partner, treating the stake as a purely financial investment or as a strategic investor in-
volved to some degree in the bank’s management. The involvement of an active investor is 
typically governed by an ad hoc agreement between the foreign party and the Chinese 
 
3 An exploration of the agreement terms reveals several interesting features:  
−  The authorities initially granted foreign investors the right to acquire stakes in mid-size banks that already had pri-
vate shareholders. Upon evaluating this experience, they authorized foreign minority stakes in three of China’s four 
large state-owned commercial banks. 
−  The nature of foreign investors has changed over time. The first wave was composed of international organizations 
with small stakes aimed at helping the restructuring of Chinese partners, while the second wave was made up of ma-
jor banks and institutional investors from Western countries and sovereign wealth funds from East Asia and the 
Middle East.  
−  Foreign strategic partners seem to be willing to obtain control participations. A relevant part of them have acquired 
the maximum stake allowed or options to increase it in the event that regulations change to allow it. 
−  A relevant part of the agreements have included development of joint businesses, such as credit cards, consumer 
finance, investment banking or wealth management. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




bank, and receives close scrutiny from the Chinese regulatory authorities, especially from 
the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission.  
This paper aims at assessing the benefits of the Chinese’s strategy of foreign partici-
pation in its banking system. Virtually all of the extensive body of literature on the benefits 
of foreign participation to banking systems in emerging countries relates to control partici-
pation by foreign banks. This paper, in contrast, explores empirically if and how the Chi-
nese banking system has benefited from the entry of foreign banks in minority roles. In ad-
dition, it examines which kinds of foreign investors (strategic, financial, private and pub-
lic) and which kinds of agreements have succeeded best in conferring benefits. Finally, 
through an empirical model on the determinants of the performance of Chinese banks, this 
paper investigates the channels through which foreign investors may have boosted perfor-
mance of local banks.  
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
effects of foreign participation on the performance of domestic banking systems and sec-
tion 3 presents the data. The methodology is set forth in section 4, while section 5 dis-
cusses stylized facts. Section 6 gives the main results. Finally, section 7 concludes with 
suggestions for further study.  
 Table 1. Agreements between foreign and local institutions 
 






Agreement terms of interest
China Everbright Bank Asian Development Bank (ADB) Oct-96 3.0 20
International Finance Corporation (IFC) Jun-05 4.9 19
Nanjing Commercial Bank IFC Nov-01 15.0 27 IFC strengthens bank's capital base and assists to improve operating and governance standards.
BNP Paribas Jun-05 19.2 87 Yes BNP advices in retail banking, fixed income securities, consumer finance, wealth management, risk 
assessment, IT and internal control and organization
Bank of Shanghai Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Co. (HSBC) Dec-01 8.0 63 Yes
Shanghai Commercial Bank (HK) Dec-01 3.0 23
IFC Dec-01 7.0 47
Shanghai Pudong Development 
Bank
Citigroup Aug-02 4.6 73 Citibank provides technical assistance and takes a seat on the board. 
They set up a joint venture to develop a co-branded credit cards.
Citibank keeps an option of increasing its stake.
Xi'an Commercial Bank IFC  Sep-02 12.4 20
Bank of Nova Scotia Jun-05 12.5 20 Yes
Nanchong Commercial Bank DEG, a subsidiary of KFW Jan-03 10.0 4 Yes
Sparkassen International Development 
Trust
3.3 2
Qingdao International Bank Hana Bank Oct-03 72.3 25 Foreign bank status
Dalian City Commercial Bank SHK Financial Nov-03 10.0 19
Bank of Nova Sotia and IFC Mar-07 24.9 24 Yes
Fujian Industrial Bank Co. Ltd Hang Seng Bank Dec-03 16.0 208 Yes Jointly developing credit card and personal loan business
IFC Dec-03 4.0 52
Government of Singapore Investment Co. Dec-03 5.0 65
Ping An Bank HSBC Mar-04 10.8 NA Yes
HSBC May-05 9.1 NA Yes
Minsheng Bank IFC Jul-04 1.1 23
Temasek Nov-04 4.6 100
Hang Seng Bank Jun-05 8.0 NA Yes
Bank of Communications  HSBC Aug-04 19.9 1747 Yes HSBC provides assistance on IT and other services
They cooperate on credit card business
GSIC 5.0 65
Shenzhen Development Bank Newbridge Capital LLC Sep-04 18.0 150
GE Consumer Finance Sep-05 7.0 100 Yes GE provides expertise in retail consumer finance (including management skills, risk assessment, product 
development and IT systems)
Jinan City Commercial Bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia Nov-04 11.0 17 Yes One seat on board of directors
Bank of Beijing ING Mar-05 19.9 215 Yes ING advices on retail banking, corporate governance, risk management and human resources
Two board seats out of 15
IFC Mar-05 5.0 54
GuangDong Development Bank Citigroup Jun-05 19.9 NA Yes Citigroup advices in credit card business. 
Two seats on bord of directors, including a vice president
IBM 4.7 165
China Construction Bank (CCB) Bank of America (BoA) Jun-05 9.0 2500 Yes BoA obtains a seat on the CCB board of directors.
Strategic assistance in areas of corporate governance, risk management, IT, financial management, 
human resource management, retail banking (including credit cards) and global treasury services. BoA will 
provide approximately 50 people to advise CCB
Tamasek Jul-05 5.1 1460 Tamasek assists CCB to improve corporate governance.  Right to nominate candidates for board of 
directors
First acquisition in the north-east part of China
HSBC and Ping An bought Fujian Asian Bank to found Ping An Bank. It was converted into a City 
Commercial Bank in 2007
    
Table 1 (cont’d). Agreements between foreign and local institutions 
 






Agreement terms of interest
Bank of China (BOC) Royal Bank of Scotland and coinvestors 
(Merrill Lynch and others)
Aug-05 10.0 3100 Yes The consortium assists BOC in credit cards, wealth management, corporate banking and personal life 
insurance. One seat on the board of directors
UBS Sep-05 1.6 500 UBS assits in investment banking
ADB Oct-05 0.2 75 ADB aim is to streamline corporate governance. It also provides technical assintance for internal control 
and anti-money laundering 
Temasek Dec-05 5.0 1500 A 10% stake was proposed, but only a 5% was approved. Tamasek assists BoC in improving corporate 
governance. Right to nominate candidates for board of directors.
Nov-07 -0.5 Tamasek decided to cut its stake
Bohai Bank Standard Chartered Sep-05 19.9 123 Yes Satandard Chartered advices in product development, risk management and governance. Right to 
nominate vice chairman and deputy CEO
Huaxia Bank Deutsche Bank Oct-05 9.9 233 Yes Launching co-branded credit cards. Cooperation in high-end customer business, distribution of investment 
products and cash management services. Provide technical support for risk management, retail and 
corporate banking and governance. Initially, one seat on board of directors
Sal Oppenheim Oct-05 4.1 96
Hangzhou City Commercial Bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia Apr-05 19.9 77 Yes Advice in credit management, marketing, IT technology, financial management and risk management. 
One seat on board of directors
ADB Nov-06 5.0 30 ADB helps to promote corporate governance and internal control procedures
ICBC Goldman Sachs, Allianz and America 
Express
Mar-06 8.5 3800 Yes Goldman Sachs assists ICBC to enhance corporate governance, risk management and internal controls. 
The former also provides expertise in treasury, asset management, corporate and investment banking, 
non-performing loans disposal and product innovation. 
Allianz Group cooperates with ICBC to provide insurance products and services to ICBC's clients. 
American Express and ICBC develops their existing strategic cooperation in the credit card business. 
One board seat.
Kuwait Investment Authority Apr-06 1.0 719 This sovereign wealth fund is in talks to expand its stake to 10%
Ningbo Commercial Bank OCBC May-06 12.2 70 Yes
Tianjin City Commercial Bank ANZ Banking Group Jul-06 19.9 112 Yes ANZ advices on risk management, retail banking and trade finance. Two seats on board of directors
Hangzhou United Rural Cooperative 
Bank
Rabobank  Jul-06 10.0 31 Yes First overseas investor in a Chinese rural cooperative bank.
Rabobank provides management expertise and technical assintance in business development, distribution 
policy, product marketing, credit control, risk management and IT. Rabobank will send a senior staff 
member  
IFC Aug-06 4.9 NA Rabobank and IFC advise Chinese authorities on rural cooperative reforms in Zhejiang province
Nan Tung Bank Morgan Stanley Sep-06 100 Full acquisition. Foreign bank status
Shanghai Rural Commercial Bank ANZ  Banking Group Ltd Sep-06 19.9 252 Yes Two seats on board of directors
CITIC Bank BBVA Nov-06 5.0 648 Yes BBVA advices on retail banking, wholesale banking, international markets, treasury, risk management and 
human resources
BBVA Jun-08 5.1 Yes BBVA has an option to increase ist stake to 15 percent until 2010
Chongqing Commercial Bank Dah Sing Bank Apr-07 17 89 Yes
Qindao City Commercial Bank Intesa Sanpaolo Jul-07 19.9 135 Yes
Rothschild Jul-07 5 33
Source: Own elaboration based on companies reports and news





2  Literature review 
There is a growing consensus in the literature that the benefits of foreign entry, in terms of 
better resource allocation and higher efficiency in domestic financial markets, outweigh the 
losses (see Levine, 1996; Walter and Gray, 1983; Gelb and Sagari, 1990). In a revision of 
the theoretical literature, Levine (1996) concludes foreign banks improve the quality and 
availability of financial services in the domestic financial market by increasing bank com-
petition and enabling the application of modern banking skills and technology. They also 
promote development of the underlying bank supervisory and legal framework, and en-
hance the country’s access to international capital. 
On the empirical side, several studies analysed the effects of foreign entry – through 
control stakes or greenfield investment – on the profitability and efficiency of local bank-
ing system. Terrell (1986) analyzes the banking sector of 14 developed countries (includ-
ing eight that allow entry of foreign banks) using aggregate data. While banking systems 
that allow foreign bank entry on average have smaller pre-tax profits and gross interest 
margins, he also finds they enjoy lower operating costs. This would point towards foreign 
entry fostering competition and efficiency. In the same vein, Claessens et al. (2000), using 
a panel of bank-level data for 80 countries, evaluate how control foreign ownership affects 
profitability, net interest margins and overhead costs of domestic institutions. Their results 
suggest that an increase in the share of foreign banks lowers the profitability and overhead 
expenses of domestic banks. More recently, Martinez-Peria and Mody (2004) investigate 
the impact of foreign bank participation and concentration on bank spreads in a sample of 
developing Latin American countries during the late 1990s. The authors find greater partic-
ipation of foreign banks spills over into the banking system, lowering spreads and costs. 
On the effects of foreign non-control stakes in the performance of the banking sector, 
there is still little evidence, especially for emerging economies. Previous research was 
mainly focused on non-financial corporations in developed nations. For instance, there is 
evidence suggesting that large minority shareholders, such as institutional investors, im-
prove overseeing of managers and mitigate free-rider problems in non-financial firms 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; McConnell and Servaes, 1995; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
On financial corporations, Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006) test these effects on bank 
efficiency using US data and find some positive influence of institutional holdings. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
To our knowledge, Berger et al. (2007) were the first to attempt (albeit indirect) mea-
surement of the effects of foreign ownership on Chinese banks. They present empirical 
evidence that smaller banks with foreign participation are more efficient than other banks. 
Their study, however, does not differentiate among types of foreign investors or take into 
account the size of the stake the foreign investor holds in the Chinese bank. Moreover, the 
paper lacks information about the terms of the agreements between investors and Chinese 
banks and, even more important, the sample ends in 2003 – the very year authorities began 
to encourage strategic investment and significant deals were signed. The authors focus on 
efficiency, overlooking broader dimensions of performance such as profitability.  
 
 
3  Variables and data 
Our panel is composed of annual data for 82 Chinese banks
4 over the period 1999–2006. 
These banks represent the main universe of Chinese banks, accounting for over 80% of to-
tal assets.
5 Not all banks could provide information for every year and some banks merged 
or closed. To keep the information on such dynamics of the Chinese banking system, we 
opt for an unbalanced panel so as not to lose too many degrees of freedom. Our sample 
contains a total of 358 observations. The number of banks varies from a minimum of 36 in 
1999 to a maximum of 67 in 2004. Note that the sample used is less than the total number 
of observations available (664); those observations with missing data for any of the va-
riables necessary for the models of performance of Chinese banks were dropped. Tables B-
1 and B-2 in the Appendix give some descriptive statistics of our sample. 
The data on the characteristics of the agreements were compiled by the authors based 
on bank reports and media. Other bank-specific data were mainly obtained from the Bank-
scope database maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk, which includes income state-
 
4 The Chinese domestic banking sector is comprised of four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). These long served 
as the lending arm of state-owned enterprises and in financing local government infrastructure projects. The rest of the 
banking system, with about 45% of total bank assets, has a diversified structure. Three state-owned development banks 
(“policy banks”) work mainly with financing long-term projects such as infrastructure. Thirteen partially private banks 
(“joint-stock commercial banks,” or JSCBs) are fairly market-oriented. More than 100 city commercial banks (CCBs), 
created out of restructuring and consolidating urban credit cooperatives, operate at the provincial level (although some 
have grown much larger).  
5 We exclude Trust and Investment Corporations (intermediate foreign funds to finance local government companies and 
infrastructure and construction projects), since their business is not purely banking and their role and number has been 




                                                
ments and balance sheet information on banks all over the world. Macroeconomic va-
riables are drawn from official sources through the CEIC database.  
We use unconsolidated statements whenever possible, although in some cases data 
availability forces us to rely on consolidated statements. Obviously, unconsolidated data 
are preferable; they bring out relevant differences in profit and loss statements and avoid 
the loss of information from balance sheets of headquarters and subsidiaries compensating 
each other. All banks ratios are calculated based on the Chinese accounting standard pro-
vided by Bankscope. Also, our emphasis is on local business and not Chinese banks’ affili-
ates abroad, which, in any event, are still quite rare. 
Our aim is to understand whether foreign participation has any relevant impact on the 
performance of Chinese banks. Bank performance is generally not easy to measure but 
much less so in China’s case. In fact, its financial sector is not fully liberalized as a floor 
on lending rates and a ceiling on deposit rates remain. Such measures obviously guarantee 
a minimum spread to all banks. In addition, Chinese banks may not necessarily have com-
mercial objectives or be managed according to market principles. There is a rich body of 
evidence on the interference of China’s public authorities in credit allocation.  
To our knowledge, there have been two attempts to measure the performance of the 
Chinese banking sector. Berger et al. (2007) focus on efficiency, while García-Herrero, 
Gavilá and Santabárbara (2006b) look into profitability. We think profitability is a better 
measure of performance in as far as the goal of the ongoing banking reform is to achieve a 
market-oriented financial institution. While we concentrate on profitability here, we also 
consider efficiency as a determinant of profitability. 
Bank profitability is proxied in many ways in the empirical literature. Here, we 
choose return on assets (ROA) as the preferred measure of profitability as it includes oper-
ational efficiency and loan loss provisioning, which are important aspects of bank perfor-
mance.6 Moreover, return on equity is clearly a poor metric in China’s case; bank equity is 
abnormally low and has suffered important artificial changes due to the State Council’s 
recapitalization programs.  
Our variables of interest capture the various dimensions of foreign involvement in 
Chinese commercial banks, i.e. we identify the channels through which foreign participa-
 
6 See García-Herrero et al. (2006b) for a detailed explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of the most commonly 
used measures of profitability. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




                                                
tion may affect performance of domestic banks. In particular, we consider four aspects of 
the agreement between a Chinese bank and its foreign investor(s): 
•  the size of foreign participation,  
•  the type of investment (strategic or financial),  
•  the ownership structure (public or private), and  
•  the terms of the agreement.  
 
To assess the size of foreign participation, we use two alternative measures: 
•  a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a foreign institution has a stake in the 
capital of a domestic institution, and  
•  the share of capital in the hands of foreigners. 
 
To make a distinction between foreign strategic and financial investment, we follow Chi-
nese regulations for strategic investment, which require a foreign stake bigger than 5%, a 
long-term commitment and transfer know-how to domestic partners. We build two alterna-
tive measures for strategic investment 
•  a dummy variable for the local banks with this type of investor and, alternatively,  
•  the share of strategic investors in the capital of domestic bank.  
 
In turn, when a foreign investor has a stake below 5% or no announced long-term com-
mitment, we consider it as financial investment. We also build two variables to capture fi-
nancial deals: 
•  a dummy variable associated with those institutions with financial investors but 
without strategic ones, and 
•  the share of financial investors in the bank’s total capital. 
 
Third, we use three dummy variables to distinguish foreign investors on the basis of their 
ownership structure: whether international organizations
7, sovereign wealth funds or pri-
vate investors.  
Finally, we use dummy variables to capture the special characteristics of the agree-
ments between the foreign investor and the Chinese bank: 
•  the possibility for the foreign partner to get a seat on the board,  
•  the inclusion of corporate governance clauses (i.e. provisions to enhance the rela-
tions between management and shareholders, risk management, IT, internal con-
trols, etc.), and  
 




                                                
•  the setting up of joint business (e.g. credit cards and consumer finance).  
 
Descriptive statistics on all foreign participation’s variables and their correlations are 
summarized in Table B-1 and B-3, respectively. 
As control variables, we introduce other potential determinants of profitability fol-
lowing García-Herrero et al. (2006b). Those can be classified into bank-specific factors, 
macroeconomic and institutional issues related to China’s bank reform. 
Among the bank-specific determinants, efficiency, asset quality and capitalization 
are particularly relevant, since they can be considered in their own right as measures of 
bank performance. For bank efficiency, we opt for a relatively sophisticated approach, 
namely X-efficiency.
8 The concept of X-efficiency hinges on the comparison of a bank’s 
actual profits with the best-practice profits to produce the same output under similar condi-
tions.
9 Among the different methodologies to estimate the profit function to measure X-
efficiency, we opt for a parametric approach based on a commonly-used translog function-
al form.
10 
For asset quality, we take the ratio of NPLs to total loans (NPL ratio) as the indica-
tor.
11 This, in fact, is the target set out by China’s supervisory authorities as part of ongo-
ing reforms. This variable has to be treated with caution given the changes in loan classifi-
 
8 There are clear advantages in using X-inefficiency as opposed to simpler measures of bank efficiency. The highly popu-
lar cost-to-income ratio, for example, is quite distorted in China’s case as lending and deposit rates are not yet fully liber-
alized. 
9 We prefer the profit X-efficiency measure over a cost-based measure, because state-owned banks may appear to per-
form well in terms of costs as they often reduce expenses in underwriting, monitoring and recovering of loans at the ex-
pense of profits. 
10 We estimate the following profit function: 
2 10 11 122 133 144 1
1 1 11 11 2 2 21 21 3 3 31 31
44 4 1 4 1 12 1
ln(P/w z ) =   +   ln(y /z ) +   ln(y /z ) +   ln(y /z ) +   ln(y /z )
+ ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z ) + ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z ) + ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z )
+ ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z ) + ½   ln(y /
δ δδ δδ
δδ δ
δδ 12 1 1 3 1 1 3 1
1 4 11 41 2 3 21 31 2 4 21 41 3 4 31 41
11 2 1 11 2 1 2 1
z ) ln(y /z ) + ½   ln(y /z )ln(y /z )
+ ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z ) + ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z ) + ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z )+ ½   ln(y /z ) ln(y /z )
+   ln(w /w ) + ½   ln(w /w ) ln(w /w ) +   ln
δ
δδδδ
ββ θ 11 1 2
2 2 11 2 3 3 11 2 4 4 11 2
it it
(y /z ) ln(w /w )
+   ln(y /z ) ln(w /w ) +  ln(y /z ) ln(w /w ) +   ln(y /z ) ln(w /w )
+ year dummies+ ln u + ln v  
θθθ
 
where P captures the bank’s total profits. The output (y) variables (total loans, total deposits, liquid assets, other earning 
assets), two input price (w) variables (interest expenses to total deposits, non-interest expenses to fixed assets), and one 
fixed input (z) variable (total earning assets). The u term is represents a bank’s efficiency level and v is a random error. 
The normalization by bank’s total earning assets (z1) reduces heteroskedasticity, and allows comparison of residual terms 
among banks. The normalization by the last input price (w2) ensures price homogeneity. Berger et al. (2007) use the same 
translog function for the Chinese case.  
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cation system, provisioning policies and ad hoc NPLs transfers from selected banks to as-
set management corporations. 
As a measure of capitalization, data constraints oblige us to use the book value of 
equity over assets. As a robustness test, we take the capital ratio, although the sample is 
shortened tremendously making the results difficult to interpret (most of the Chinese insti-
tutions began to report the capital ratio only in 2003).  
Among other bank-specific factors, corporate governance is hardest to measure. In-
deed, the term originates in collegial decision-making processes developed centuries ago in 
Western democracies and transplants poorly into the Chinese context. Thus, the lack of in-
formation on political intervention and state control and influence oblige us to introduce 
indirect measures that may relate to weak corporate governance. For instance, a dummy 
reflecting the type of bank ownership should capture differences in state intervention. We 
also include a dummy that captures if the bank is listed in the stock market, since this could 
be associated with better banking practices. Other measures related to corporate gover-
nance can be derived from bank balance sheet ratios such as loans to assets or deposits to 
assets. The former might be explained by the government’s use of moral suasion to allo-
cate credit to certain sectors. The latter might stem from the government offering implicit 
guarantees to state-owned banks and banks more heavily subject to government interven-
tion.  
Market power is an important bank-specific factor. Again, acknowledging the diffi-
culties of measuring market power and the poor quality of the Chinese data, we apply stan-
dard definitions. Since it is not the focus of the paper, however, we proxy market power 
first with a measure of market share (i.e. each bank’s total assets over those of the whole 
banking system), and second as concentration. We prefer the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 
as measure of concentration as it takes into account all banks, not just the big ones. Fur-
ther, it considers the inequality of market shares. This index is defined as the sum of the 
squared market shares of each bank’s assets for a given year. It is slightly greater than 0 for 
a perfectly competitive market and equals 10,000 in the case of a monopoly.  
Among the macroeconomic variables, we include the real interest rate on loans, real 
GDP growth and inflation. 
Finally, two institutional aspects are included:  
•  China’s degree of financial liberalization, measured by the maximum spread be-










4  Methodology 
We aim at determining empirically the effects of foreign bank participation in its different 
forms on the performance of Chinese banks.  
To this end, we use a three-stage approach. First, we test whether the Chinese bank-
ing system has benefited from foreign participation in terms of improved bank profitabili-
ty, and analyse which elements of foreign participation have been most beneficial. This is 
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The third step aims at assessing how various features of foreign participation influence the 
relevant determinants of profitability and, hence, the channels through which they ulti-
mately affect performance of local banks.
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Each of these steps contains econometric challenges. 
To determine the impact of different kinds of foreign investment on profitability, we 
consider the well-documented phenomenon of persistence of profitability by introducing 
its lag as additional regressor. In addition, unobservable heterogeneity across banks could 
be very large in the Chinese case, particularly given the difficulty in evaluating corporate 
                                                 
12 In our first attempt, we estimated all potential determinants of profitability in a single equation. Most of the foreign 
investor variables were not significant. Hence, we decided to follow the sequential approach presented here. We assume 
foreign participation not only affects profitability directly but also indirectly through its determinants. BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
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governance.
13 To deal with this, we employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
following Arellano and Bover (1995). The “GMM estimator” technique allows us to in-
clude an unobserved time invariant fixed effect by bank and control for persistence and 
endogeneity issues using the lags of the dependent variables in levels and in differences, as 
well as lagged values of foreign banks variables. 
The main problem in assessing the determinants of profitability is the potential endo-
geneity of certain determinants. For example, more profitable banks may have sufficient 
resources to provision for their NPLs. They may also find it easier to increase their cus-
tomer base through a successful advertising campaign, and thereby enhance profitability. 
Finally, more profitable banks may hire the most skilled personnel and thereby influence 
their operational efficiency. To tackle these problems, we go beyond the methodology cur-
rently in use in the literature (fixed or random effects) and employ the Arellano-Bover es-
timator as at the previous stage. To avoid the risk of omitted variables, we also estimate a 
general equation that includes all possible determinants of profitability mentioned in the 
literature, as well as China’s specific characteristics. Using a Wald test, we test the joint 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the variables that are not significant individually are 
equal to zero. If not rejected, we re-estimate the model only with the controls that were 
significant in the general regression. Otherwise, we test a less-restrictive hypothesis, while 
still trying to reduce the number of non-significant regressors as much as possible. This 
sequential (general to specific) specification strategy is followed until we reject that the 
remaining set of coefficients of the control variables (i.e. equal to zero). The coefficients 
obtained in this way has greater effect as the number of regressors is reduced to the mini-
mum and allow us to identify the channels that truly affect profitability. Finally, given that 
our sample has a large N and a small T, macroeconomic variables (which do not change 
across N) must be estimated with very low degrees of freedom. Thus, we introduce a 
second model where macroeconomic regressors are substituted by time dummies. 
With the main determinants of profitability identified, we now estimate how the dif-
ferent types of foreign investment might influence them. We work from the assumption 
 
13 Other problem is the theoretical endogeneity of the variables that capture the foreign investment since overseas inves-
tors will pick up the best-performer domestic partners. However, we expect that this potential problem is not very rele-
vant since Chinese authorities are guiding the acquisitions. In other words, foreign banks appear not to have been able to 
choose the best local counterparts. On the contrary, anecdotal evidence suggests that the authorities matched foreigners 
with less-than-stellar performers. Table B-4 in the appendix shows that the performance of the local banks with and with-
out foreign investors in any moment was quite similar until 2003 when the foreign entry was encouraged. However, we 




that the characteristics of foreign presence are exogenous to the main determinants of prof-
itability. This is quite likely the Chinese case, where the entry of foreign investors has been 
carefully guided by the authorities. Under such circumstances, the fixed effect estimator 
should deal with unobserved heterogeneity and provide unbiased estimations. 
 
 
5  Stylized facts 
Before moving to the results, it is worthwhile to reflect on a few stylized facts of the rela-
tion between foreign ownership and bank performance. To this end, we calculate condi-
tional means for the different aspects of bank performance. For example, we calculate the 
mean profitability of Chinese banks with foreign participation against those without for-
eign participation. Figure 2 shows banks with foreign participation have lower profitability 
overall. This pattern no longer holds, however, if we separate strategic from financial in-
vestors. Banks with foreign strategic partners are more profitable on average than those 
with no foreign investors. In the same vein, a bank that has engaged in any of the main fea-
tures of a strategic agreement performs better than banks without foreign participation (i.e. 
the terms of the agreement grant the foreign investor a seat on the board, include a clause 
on improved corporate governance or open a new joint business between the two partners). 
Such positive outcomes for strategic investors, at least from what can be seen from such 
simple stylized facts, contrasts markedly with that for financial investors, whose profitabil-
ity is far lower than those of local banks without foreign participation. Regarding the own-
ership structure of foreign investors, banks with international organizations as foreign part-
ners tend to be less profitable than those without any foreign investors. The opposite is true 
when the foreign investor is a sovereign wealth fund or a private shareholder. 
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Regarding efficiency, local banks with foreign partners perform slightly better than those 
without (Figure 3). This is especially true for banks with private strategic investors that 
have a seat on the board or a corporate governance agreement. 
 
 


























Chinese banks have generally improved their asset quality as seen from the general reduc-
tion in NPLs in Figure 4. However, banks without foreign investors seem to have been the 
most aggressive at cleaning up their balance sheets. In the case of banks with strategic in-
vestors, the difference is marginal. The same is true for private foreign investors. Much 
smaller reductions in NPLs are found for banks where the foreign partners are international 
organizations. Finally, Chinese banks engaged in a new joint business with their strategic 
partners are associated with the largest reductions in NPLs.  



































The capitalization of Chinese banks with foreign partners, measured by the capital ratio, 
has increased markedly (Figure 5). This fact could seem relatively obvious as of the injec-
tions of foreigners should rather automatically increase the capital base. As before, banks 
with strategic partners (especially private) perform better. When capitalization is measured 
by the equity-to-assets ratio (which, unlike the capital ratio, was available for our full sam-
ple), this trend is not shown (Figure 6). This could well be related to the roughness of the 
proxy used.  
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Figure 6. Change in equity-to-assets ratio 
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These stylized facts point to increased profitability for those Chinese banks with strategic 
partners or, at least, private investors. Such trend is generally maintained when analyzing 
other important aspects of bank performance such as efficiency, asset quality and capitali-
zation. From pure statistical tools, we now move to panel regression analysis and test 
whether these preliminary findings are confirmed. 
 
 
6  Results 
We investigate the determinants of bank profitability in China with annual panel data for as 
many as 82 banks during the period 1999–2006. Despite data limitations, we follow a 
three- step approach than allows not only determination of the effects of foreign investors 
on profitability but also analysis of the channels through which such effects are transmit-
ted. The methodologies employed at each stage account for unobserved heterogeneity 
across banks and, if necessary, potential endogeneity of regressors and persistence of prof-
itability. This approach should yield consistent estimators of the parameters.  
In the first stage, we assess the direct effect of foreign participation on the profitabili-
ty of the Chinese banking system, measured by the pre-tax ROA (Table 2). Foreign inves-
tors tend to improve profitability; the larger the stake, the greater the improvement. This 
supports the hypothesis that foreign investment is beneficial for the domestic banking sys-




nancial, the previous result only holds for the former, i.e. only strategic investors seem to 
manage to bring the benefit of better performance for the whole system. The coefficients of 
the strategic investment variables and their lags are significant at 99%, whereas the coeffi-
cients of financial variables are not found significant. 
While private investors are found to bring benefits, international organizations and 
sovereign wealth funds do not. The positive effect is greater and more significant years af-
ter the agreement was reached, perhaps indicating other synergies arise once the adjust-
ment is achieved.  
 
Table 2. Foreign investor’s effect on profitability 
Dependent variable: 
Log of pre-tax ROA
Foreign participation 0.195**
(0.031)










L. Strategic investor 0.253***
(0.001)
L. Financial investor -0.022
(0.845)
Stake Strategic investor 1.424***
(0.002)
Stake Financial investor 0.988
(0.354)
L. Stake Strategic investor 2.023***
(0.000)








L. International organization -0.165
(0.125)
L. Sovereign wealth fund 0.195
(0.115)
L. Private investor 0.266***
(0.001)






L. Foreigners on the board 0.239
(0.147)
L. Corporate governance 0.115
(0.203)
L. New business -0.145
(0.394)
L. Log Pre-tax ROA 0.623*** 0.611*** 0.600*** 0.600*** 0.619*** 0.596*** 0.586*** 0.591*** 0.617*** 0.594*** 0.609*** 0.585***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -1.881*** -1.925*** -1.995*** -1.983*** -1.900*** -1.996*** -2.066*** -2.022*** -1.910*** -2.004*** -1.946*** -2.054***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274 274
Number of banks 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
Hansen test (0.404) (0.243) (0.379) (0.243) (0.534) (0.518) (0.300) (0.481) (0.487) (0.591) (0.226) (0.260)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.877) (0.976) (0.786) (0.955) (0.836) (0.992) (0.784) (0.955) (0.842) (0.974) (0.777) (0.978)
Public Vs Private Agreement Terms Foreign Strategic Vs Financial
Robust first stage p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
 
Regarding agreement terms, we only find that corporate governance clauses are associated 
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the board or strategic alliances to develop new businesses are not found significant in fos-
tering the profitability of the banking system. 
In the second stage, we identify which are the main determinants of Chinese bank 
profitability (Table 3). We have two specifications: one including macroeconomic controls 
and another with time dummies to reflect the short time span of our sample (left and right 
columns, respectively). In addition, two regressions are shown for each specification: one 
for the full set of explanatory variables (first and third columns) and another with the re-
stricted set based on the previously described Wald test of individual and joint insignific-
ance (second and fourth columns). The estimators of the restricted specifications suggest 
that a higher X-efficiency (at more than the 90% confidence level), a lower NPL ratio (at 
the 99% confidence level) and a higher equity to assets ratio (at more than the 95% confi-
dence level) are important determinants of profitability. Therefore, we confirm that the 
most relevant channels through which profitability improves are efficiency, asset quality 
and capitalization.
14  
   
 
14 Other interesting results are a more concentrated banking system is found to reduce pre-tax ROA in a statistically sig-
nificant way. In the Chinese case, the degree of concentration is very much related to the weight of the four SOCBs in the 
banking system. Since these banks are more affected by government intervention, the result could be interpreted to sug-
gest that government ownership is detrimental to bank profitability in China. Another interesting finding is the persis-
tence of the pre-provision profits, marked by the high significance of lagged variable that took into consideration in the 
first stage model. This could hint at government interference as banks are given yearly targets for asset quality and capi-
talization which makes it hard to have sharp changes in the business models, even if opportunities arise to increase profit-
ability. Finally, from the macroeconomic variables included, higher real interest rates on loans and inflation appear to 
foster profitability. The latter results, however, should be treated with great care, given that a very small number of ob-




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: 





L. Log Pre-tax ROA 0.477*** 0.572*** 0.459*** 0.552***
Table 3. Profitability Determinants 
  
(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.001)
Technical efficiency 0.809*** 0.364* 0.917*** 0.546**
(0.000) (0.069) (0.000) (0.021)
Log Transformation of NPL ratio -0.813 -0.705*** -0.591 -0.596***
(0.165) (0.000) (0.270) (0.000)
Log Equity over Assets -0.024 0.230** -0.056 0.188**
(0.809) (0.013) (0.555) (0.050)
Log Loans over Assets 0.243 0.178
(0.208) (0.374)
Loans growth rate of bank i 0.108 0.140
(0.263) (0.161)






Market share on assets -0.001 -0.001*** -0.002 -0.001***
(0.299) (0.003) (0.179) (0.006)
Concentration. Herfindahl Index 0.000 -0.000*
(0.617) (0.054)








Log std. dev. of IBOR -0.051
(0.829)






Observations 198 207 198 210
Number of  Bank Name 61 68 61 71
Hansen test (1.000) (0.942) (1.000) (0.896)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences (0.471) (0.456) (0.405) (0.496)
Robust first stage p-values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%






























In the third stage, our goal is to evaluate the effects of foreign investment on the previously 
identified determinants of profitability and, hence, draw some conclusions on the channels 
through which overseas investors may influence the profitability of the Chinese banking 
system.  
We first concentrate on X-efficiency (Table 4). The results are very similar to those 
for profitability:  
•  Foreign investors tend to enhance the efficiency of domestic institutions (the larger 
the stake, the greater the efficiency gain); 
•  Strategic investors bring higher efficiency gains than financial investors; 
•  Private investors enhance efficiency relatively more (and more significantly in 
some cases) than international organizations or sovereign wealth funds; and  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




•  Among the agreement terms, only corporate governance provisions foster bank ef-
ficiency.  
 















Stake Strategic investor 0.709***
(0.000)














Constant -0.572*** -0.568*** -0.571*** -0.568*** -0.569*** -0.568***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 338 338 338 338 338 338
Number of banks 82 82 82 82 82 82
R-squared 0.215 0.217 0.223 0.221 0.212 0.202
Robust p values in parentheses
Foreign Strategic Vs Financial
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
Next, we investigate the influence of overseas investment on asset quality (Table 5). The 
results are also quite similar:  
•  Foreign participation tends to reduce the NPL ratio (the larger the participation the 
lower the NPL ratio);  
•  Strategic and financial investors both seem to promote asset quality, although the 
effect of the former seems stronger;  
•  Private investors seem to do a better job at reducing the NPL ratio; and  
•  Corporate governance is the only characteristic of the agreements that enhances as-
set quality.  
 




















Stake Strategic investor -4.876***
(0.000)














Constant -2.568*** -2.630*** -2.573*** -2.630*** -2.600*** -2.609***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000
Observations 263 263 263 263 263 263
R-squared 0.172 0.141 0.175 0.141 0.174 0.16
Number of banks 67 67 67 67 67 67
Robust p values in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%






















Finally, we analyze whether foreign partners influence the capitalization of the banking 
system, measured by equity to assets ratio (Table 6). This is the only case where foreign 
investors seem to have no influence. Surprisingly, the only significant factor seems to be 
the establishment of a strategic alliance to develop a new business area, but just at the 90% 
confidence level. It should be noted, however, that the proxy used for bank capitalization is 
very poor. In fact, the stylized facts already showed that its evolution was quite different to 
that of the capital ratio, and unfortunately, only available for a few banks. 
Generally, we find evidence that foreign investors (particularly strategic and private 
investors) exert a positive influence on the profitability of Chinese banks. The channels 
through which foreign investors seem to influence are mainly improved efficiency and as-
set quality. 
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Table 6. Foreign investor’s effect on capitalization  
 
Dependent variable: 













Stake Strategic investor 0.119
(0.797)














Constant -3.146*** -3.149*** -3.145*** -3.150*** -3.150*** -3.143***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 357 357 357 357 357 357
R-squared 0 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.009
Number of banks 83 83 83 83 83 83
Robust p values in parentheses
Foreign Strategic Vs Financial
  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
 
 
7  Conclusions 
Our empirical results support the view that China’s gradual approach to bank reform 
through restricted and geared entrance of foreign investors has, so far, brought benefits to 
the Chinese banking system. Such benefits are only realized, however, when the foreign 
investor is actively involved (i.e. through a strategic partnership). To reap such benefits, a 
key term in the agreements between strategic investors and Chinese banks is the improve-
ment of corporate governance. Having a seat at the board seems to more of a nominal than 
a real advantage. We also find that private foreign investors have more influence than pub-
lic investors, no matter if they are international organizations or sovereign wealth funds.  
In conclusion, the results show that they way in which China has opened up to for-
eign competition has so far been successful. However, a hypothetical issue remains open: 
Would China would have benefited even more from foreign investors taking larger stakes, 
and even controlling stakes, in Chinese banks?  
Does China’s model hold lessons for other emerging countries? The reality is that at-




ing countries (except perhaps the other BRICs: India, Brazil and Russia). However, if a 
country were able to do so, our results points to benefits, compared to a fully domestic fi-
nancial system, at least when allowing for a strategic partnership. This conclusion seems 
intuitively correct as it conforms to the existing literature and can be explained in terms of 
transfer of technology, skills, etc. Our results also point to improved corporate governance 
playing a key role. 
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Appendix A. The opening of the banking system to foreign competition 
The opening of the banking system to foreign competition has been conducted in the light 
of a comprehensive reform of the Chinese banking system. Under current regulations, for-
eign banks can operate directly in China through branches or subsidiaries they establish 
themselves, or indirectly through minority participation in authorized domestic banks.  
Chinese authorities have used foreign banks as catalysts of banking reform that en-
courages local banks to adopt good corporate governance and risk management policies. 
At the same time, authorities have shied away from a dramatic shake-up in the ownership 
structure of banks by limiting foreign investors to minority stakes.  
With its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China took an 
important step towards opening up its banking system. In particular, the commitment to 
gradual increasing access of foreign banks in the provision of banking services over a five-
year transition period implicitly signalled China’s intent to reform and develop its financial 
markets.  
In December 2003, the government issued foreign strategic investment rules that 
specifically granted foreign investors the possibility of taking minority stakes in local 
banks. The program served two purposes: its let foreigners finance the recapitalization of 
underperforming local banks and helped modernize the banking system as a whole through 
the transfer of international know-how into the Chinese context. Generally, the government 
sought to reduce the public interference in lending. More specifically, the chief regulator, 
the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission, sought to keep tight control over foreign 
participation by limiting individual foreign ownership to 20% of a bank’s capital, and joint 
participation to 25%, and requiring official approval of any stake purchase. Furthermore, 
foreign investors have been required to commit principles that include to long-term in-
volvement (particularly, maintaining a minimum stake of 5% in the local bank for at least 
three years), management through the appointment of directors, improving corporate go-
vernance and cooperating in various business areas. Finally, the foreign strategic investor 
program prohibits foreign participation in more than two local banks to avoid conflicts of 
interest and market dominance.  
New legislation governing subsidiaries and branches, adopted in December 2006, 
marked the end of the WTO transition period. The new rules call for equal treatment be-
tween foreign and local financial institutions.  BOFIT- Institute for Economies in Transition 
Bank of Finland 




Appendix B. Descriptive statistics 
Table B-1. Descriptive statistics of the agreements 
Obs. Number of 1 Mean
Std. 
Deviation Min. Pct. 1% Pct. 99% Max.
Foreign participation 664 70 0.11 0.31 0 0 1 1
Foreign stake 664 - 0.01 0.05 0 0 0.25 0.34
Strategic investor 664 50 0.08 0.26 0 0 1 1
Financial investor 664 20 0.03 0.17 0 0 1 1
Stake Strategic investor 664 - 0.01 0.04 0 0 0.199 0.25
Stake Financial investor 664 - 0.00 0.02 0 0 0.124 0.15
International organization 664 29 0.04 0.20 0 0 1 1
Sovereign wealth fund 664 11 0.02 0.13 0 0 1 1
Private investor 664 55 0.08 0.28 0 0 1 1
Foreigners on the board 664 22 0.03 0.18 0 0 1 1
  
Corporate governance agreement 664 58 0.09 0.28 0 0 1 1
New business agreement 664 13 0.02 0.14 0 0 1 1
 
Table B-2. Descriptive statistics of the profitability determinants 
   Obs. Mean
Std. 
Deviation Min. Pct. 1% Pct. 99% Max.
Pre-tax ROA 347 0.8 0.5 -0.7 0.0 2.1 2.2
Equity over Assets 358 5.1 5.3 -10.8 1.2 22.6 78.3
NPL ratio 263 9.3 8.3 0.2 0.3 38.2 41.4
Technical profit efficiency 338 55.0 19.9 14.7 17.4 88.5 90.3
Loans over Assets 358 55.8 12.6 11.0 30.8 94.8 96.4
Loans growth rate of bank i 289 26.5 40.0 -36.6 -20.3 201.5 501.5
Deposits over Assets 358 77.8 17.8 1.4 2.9 95.8 105.8
Listed 664 0.06 0.23 0 0 1 1
Recapitalized 664 0.00 0.05 0 0 0 1
Market share on assets 358 1.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 16.7 18.9
Herfindahl Index 664 560 164 298 298 763 763
Real interest rate on loans 1 year (reference) 664 4.7 1.7 1.4 1.4 7.6 7.6
Spread between 1 year loan and deposits rate 664 3.4 0.1 3.2 3.2 3.6 3.6
Real GDP growth 664 9.4 1.1 7.6 7.6 11.1 11.1
Inflation 664 0.9 1.5 -1.4 -1.4 3.9 3.9
Std. dev. of IBOR 664 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.7
SOCBs 664 0.05 0.21 0 0 1 1
JSCBs 664 0.12 0.33 0 0 1 1
CCBs 664 0.70 0.46 0 0 1 1
Credit Cooperatives 664 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 1




























Foreign stake 0.87 1
Strategic investor 0.83 0.87 1
Financial investor 0.51 0.22 -0.05 1
Stake Strategic investor 0.76 0.92 0.92 -0.05 1
Stake Financial investor 0.68 0.71 0.40 0.61 0.38 1
International organization 0.62 0.56 0.30 0.65 0.28 0.83 1
Sovereign wealth fund 0.38 0.38 0.41 0.05 0.34 0.29 0.26 1
Private investor 0.88 0.84 0.91 0.17 0.85 0.45 0.31 0.35 1
Foreigners on the board 0.54 0.50 0.55 0.12 0.52 0.24 0.17 0.24 0.62 1
Corporate governance agreement 0.90 0.88 0.92 0.20 0.85 0.56 0.38 0.38 0.91 0.60 1









   
Table B-3. Correlation among foreign investment variables 
  




Table B-4. Descriptive statistics of the performance of banks with and without foreign partners 
 




Pre-tax ROA Without foreign participation -0.07
Pre-tax ROA With foreign participation -0.08
Pre-tax ROA Total  -0.08
Profit efficiency 
(1)  Without foreign participation 5.60
Profit efficiency 
(1)  With foreign participation 4.96
Profit efficiency 
(1)  Total  5.27
NPL ratio Without foreign participation -3.78
NPL ratio With foreign participation -2.64
NPL ratio Total  -3.04
Capital ratio  Without foreign participation -1.49
Capital ratio  With foreign participation -1.44
Capital ratio  Total  -1.45
Equity over assets Without foreign participation -0.03
Equity over assets With foreign participation -0.26
Equity over assets Total  -0.14
(1) 1 for best-performing bank, 0 for the worst
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